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From the end of the second century C.E., Judaism enforced a religious norm requiring
any Jewish father to educate his children. We present evidence supporting our thesis that
this exogenous change in the religious and social norm had a major inﬂuence on Jewish
economic and demographic history. First, the high individual and community cost of edu-
cating children in subsistence farming economies (2nd to 7th centuries) prompted voluntary
conversions, which account for a large share of the reduction in the size of the Jewish pop-
ulation from about 4.5 million to 1.2 million. Second, the Jewish farmers who invested
in education, gained the comparative advantage and incentive to enter skilled occupations
during the vast urbanization in the newly developed Muslim Empire (7th and 8th centuries)
and they actually did select themselves into these occupations. Third, as merchants the
Jews invested even more in education–a pre-condition for the extensive mailing network
and common court system that endowed them with trading skills demanded all over the
world. Fourth, the Jews generated a voluntary diaspora by migrating within the Muslim
Empire, and later to western Europe where they were invited to settle as high skill inter-
mediaries by local rulers. By 1200, the Jews were living in hundreds of towns from England
and Spain in the West to China and India in the East. Fifth, the majority of world Jewry
(about one million) lived in the Near East when the Mongol invasions in the 1250s brought
this region back to a subsistence farming economy in which many Jews found it diﬃcult to
enforce the religious norm regarding education, and hence, voluntarily converted, exactly
as it had happened centuries earlier.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J1, J2, N3, O1, Z12, Z13
Keywords: social norms, religion, human capital, Jewish economic and demographic history,
occupational choice, migration.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Do changes in religious and social norms have long-term eﬀects on economic and demo-
graphic outcomes?1 We address this question by studying one of the best documented
historical examples of an exogenous change in religious norms that had a huge impact on
long-term economic and demographic patterns. Speciﬁcally, we show that the implementa-
tion from the second century C.E. of the religious norm requiring Jewish fathers to educate
their sons determined three major patterns in Jewish history: (i) a comparative advantage
in urban, skilled occupations in which the Jews selected themselves when urbanization and
the development of a commercial economy provided them with the returns to their invest-
ment in education, (ii) a slow process of conversions out of Judaism among Jews who lived
in subsistence economies, and (iii) the voluntary diaspora of the Jews in search of worldwide
opportunities in crafts, trade, moneylending, and other skilled occupations.
In Botticini and Eckstein (2005), which we brieﬂy summarize in Section 2, we describe
in detail the implementation of the religious reform from the second to the sixth centuries
C.E., which radically transformed Judaism from a religion mainly based on sacriﬁces in
the Temple into a religion whose core was the reading of the Torah in the synagogue. The
transformation was further advanced by the Jewish religious leaders who encouraged the
building of synagogues in many towns and villages all over Eretz Israel, promoted the status
of teachers and scholars and downgraded the status of illiterate people (ammei ha-aretz)b y
making them outcast in the Jewish community. Since the religious reform was initiated and
ﬁrst implemented in Eretz Israel and later in Babylon where almost all Jews were farmers
and illiterate, it could not have been prompted by economic incentives. Thus, we take the
change in the social and religious norm as exogenous.
Based on these facts, we formally present our thesis on the implications of the religious
transformation for Jewish history by constructing a simple model of farmers’ decisions re-
garding their own religion and their sons’ education (Section 3). The goal of the model is
to provide a simple framework from which we precisely identify the assumptions and impli-
cations that we can bring to the historical evidence. Allowing for heterogeneity in farmers’s
incomes, children’s learning abilities, and levels of attachment to the Jewish religion, we
study the conditions under which some Jewish farmers invest in their children’s religious
literacy and other farmers do not. We show that there is always a proportion of Jews who
decide not to educate their sons and to convert out of Judaism. Hence, the model predicts
that Judaism with its increased emphasis on literacy and education cannot survive in the
long-run in a subsistence farming society.
Jewish demographic history supports this prediction regarding a slow process of vol-
untary conversions (Section 4). From the beginning of the ﬁrst millennium to the sixth
century C.E., the Jewish population decreased from about 4.5 million to about 1.2 million.
We show that, while many Jews in Eretz Israel and Egypt lost their lives during the crushing
of the rebellions against Roman rule in the ﬁrst and second centuries, a large share of the
1Recent papers on economics of religion include Chiswick (1988), Iannaccone (1992; 1998), Chiswick
(1999), Berman (2000; 2003), Carlton and Weiss (2001), Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002), Barro and McCleary
(2003), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003).
1reduction in the Jewish population in the ﬁrst half of the millennium was the outcome of
conversions among the poor, uneducated rural population once the implementation of the
religious/social norm regarding children’s education became too expensive in subsistence
farming economies, such as Eretz Israel and Mesopotamia in the second-sixth centuries.
In contrast, the Jewish farmers who invested in education gained the comparative ad-
vantage and incentive to enter skilled occupations during the vast urbanization in the newly
developed Muslim Empire (7th and 8th centuries). This occupational transition was an en-
dogenous and voluntary selection of literate Jewish farmers into skilled occupations when
the vast urbanization in the Near East created a large demand for these occupations (Section
5, and for details see Botticini and Eckstein 2005).
We then extend the model to study the choice of religion and children’s education of
craftsmen, merchants, and urban dwellers (Section 6). Literacy and education, which do not
aﬀect farmers’ incomes, positively aﬀect craftsmen’s and merchants’ earnings. The model
predicts that (i) Jewish merchants invest more in their sons’ education than Jewish farmers
and non-Jewish farmers and merchants, and (ii) without a large tax penalty or occupational
restrictions for being a Jewish individual, Jewish merchants do not convert.
The historical evidence is consistent with these predictions. Once the Jews became high-
skilled craftsmen, merchants, tax-farmers, moneylenders, and doctors, they further invested
in their sons’ religious and general education, attaining levels of education comparatively
higher with respect to non-Jews at that time. Moreover, there were no mass conversions of
Jews in the Muslim Empire and the size of the Jewish population remained roughly constant
from the eighth to the twelfth century (Section 7).
The main insight of our thesis is that Judaism with its costly religious and social norm
requiring Jewish fathers to educate their sons cannot survive in the long run in subsistence
farming economies where literacy does not increase earnings. It can survive in the long
r u no n l yi fJ e w sc a nﬁnd occupations such as crafts and trade in which their earnings
signiﬁcantly gain from literacy. We present two additional historical facts that support this
argument: ﬁrst, the voluntary diaspora of the Jews to western Europe during the tenth-
thirteenth centuries (Section 8), and, second, the voluntary conversions of Jews in the Near
East after the Mongol invasions of Iraq and Persia in the 1250s (Section 9).
Within the Muslim Empire, Jewish craftsmen and merchants freely migrated and set-
tled in Egypt, North Africa, and Spain. The rise of Cordoba under Muslim rule as the
largest European city before the end of the millennium coincided with the growth of a small
but very wealthy and intellectually prominent Jewish community. In the tenth-thirteenth
centuries, the Jews also migrated to France, Germany, and England upon invitation by
kings, bishops, and local rulers. In these countries, they established small but wealthy
communities in hundreds of towns and cities where they were locally protected and free
to engage in almost any occupation. The numerous early medieval charters and privileges,
which we summarize, indicate that European cities competed for Jewish skilled intermedi-
aries at a time when literacy rates in the local populations were at most 10 percent (Reis
2004). The voluntary migrations to western Europe contributed to the development of three
increasingly distinct and separate Jewish communities. Under the intellectual leadership
of Maimonides, the Jewish communities in Muslim Spain developed distinctive rules and
2customs with respect to the Ashkenazi Jewish communities in Germany, France, and Eng-
land, which blossomed under the leadership of Rashi. Both communities established new
academies that continued the tradition of the Babylonian Talmud but, at the same time,
developed their own intellectual centers independent of the large Jewish center in Iraq.
More than one thousand years after the transformation that had made Judaism a religion
centered on education, the Mongols invaded Persia and Iraq in 1256-60 and destroyed the
economy. Because of massacres, starvation, and epidemics, in less than two hundred years
the total population was reduced by half. The Jewish population in Iraq and Persia shrank
from about 800 thousands to about 100 thousands in the two hundreds years following
the economic disaster brought by the Mongol invasion. There is no evidence that they
migrated in huge numbers to western Europe. Moreover, their death rate from starvation
and epidemics was similar to the rest of the population, and the death toll from massacres
by the Mongols was lower among Jews. The much larger reduction of the Jewish population
after the Mongol shock was the outcome of voluntary conversions, as Baron (1952, vol. 17,
p. 183) and Ashtor (1959, pp. 65—66) have shown. These conversions among low income
Jews when the economy became again a subsistence farming one is consistent with the main
insight of our theory.
Our explanation is an alternative view in comparison with the two existing theories.
The well known and commonly accepted view that the Jewish people selected into urban
occupations because they were prohibited from owning land does not pass the test of the
historical evidence. In the Roman Empire, in Parthian and Sassanian Mesopotamia, and
especially later in all the lands of the Muslim Empire, the Jewish people could own land
and engage in any occupation including farming. A less known view, the theory set forth
by Simon Kuznets (1960) that the Jews, like any other minorities, chose to engage in urban
occupations in order to maintain their religious and group identity, is also contradicted by
the historical facts.2
For an economist, the main lesson from Jewish history is that “culture matters” and
that cultural traits can be exceedingly long lived. From this viewpoint, our work contributes
to the literature that studies the interactions between cultural values, social norms, and
economic outcomes.3 Greif (1994), for example, has shown how diﬀerent cultural beliefs
among Jewish (Maghribi) traders and Genoese traders brought a divergence in their societal
organizations in the early Middle Ages. In our paper, we argue that the network externality
among Jewish traders highlighted by Greif could not exist without the common written
language (Hebrew), the high literacy levels, and the common law (Talmud).
Our work also illustrates that some contemporary economic patterns (e.g., the selection
of Jewish people into high-skill jobs) have been inﬂuenced by institutions and social norms
that emerged centuries ago. From this viewpoint, our research is related to the work of
2In Mesopotamia, the Jews were a minority both when most of them were farmers and when they
became merchants. In Eretz Israel, most Jews were engaged in agriculture regardless of whether they were
the majority of the population (up to the end of the third century) or a minority (from the fourth century and
in the Byzantine period). See Botticini and Eckstein (2005) for a detailed discussion of these two alternative
theories regarding Jewish history.
3See, among many others, North (1990), Temin (1997), and Mokyr (2002). An excellent survey is in
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (forthcoming).
3Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005) that show how speciﬁcE u r o p e a n
institutions dating back to the Middle Ages aﬀected the long-run economic performance
of Europe and later the economic development of its former colonies, and to the work of
Kuran (1997, 2003, 2004) that traces the long-term underdevelopment of some Middle East
countries back to institutions (such as the waqfs) established to fulﬁll Islamic religious law.
2 Jewish Religious Reform, 200 BCE—200 CE: A Summary
At the beginning of the ﬁrst millennium in Eretz Israel, there were many religious groups and
sects including pagans.4 Even within Judaism, the religion of the majority of the population,
there were numerous groups such as the Sadducees, the Pharisees, the Samaritans, the
Essenes, and the Zealots. Christianity too grew within Judaism in the ﬁrst century C.E.
Despite being similar and interrelated in their daily lives, people belonging to diﬀerent
religious groups were becoming increasingly distinguished in their religious rules and norms.
Before the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 C.E., the two main groups
were the Sadducees who accepted only the Written Torah and adopted the Hellenistic
culture, and the Pharisees who aimed to expand the study of both the Written and the
Oral Torah among all Jews, and opposed the expansion of the Greek language and culture
(Cohen 2002; and Feldman 2002).5 To reach this goal, some Pharisees prompted a major
change in the educational institutions by ﬁrst (around the ﬁrst century B.C.E.) encouraging
the establishment of free secondary schools throughout Eretz Israel, and later (in the ﬁrst
century C.E.) by issuing a religious ordinance asking parents to send their six or seven years
old sons to school to read and learn the Torah.
When the Temple was destroyed by the Roman army to crush the rebellion in Judaea,
the Sadducees lost the source of their power and shortly after disappeared as a group within
Judaism. Meanwhile, the Pharisees, who did not participate in the rebellion, became the
dominant group and gave a major push to the religious and educational reform that they
had started in the second—ﬁrst centuries B.C.E. They replaced sacriﬁces, which could only
be performed in the Temple in Jerusalem, with the study of the Torah in the synagogue,
whose main function was to provide religious instruction to both children and adults.
After 70 C.E., the religious leadership became vested in the rabbis and scholars in
the academy who interpreted the Torah, discussed religious norms as well as social and
economic matters pertaining to daily life, and organized the vast body of Jewish Oral
Law accumulated through the centuries.6 Rabbi Judah ha-Nassi completed their work
by redacting the Mishna in about 200 C.E.7 Under his inﬂuence, the word am ha-aretz
(literally: people of the land) acquired the new meaning of “someone who does not know
4See Botticini and Eckstein (2005) for a detailed description and references.
5The Written Torah refers to the ﬁrst ﬁve books of the Bible, the Oral Torah consists of the rulings of
scholars and rabbis regarding the implementation of the Written Torah.
6The existence of the Oral Torah indicates, by itself, that literacy was not widespread in ancient Eretz
Israel. If most of people could not read, there was no need to write down the religious rules.
7The Mishna consists of six volumes of rules regarding farming, religious holidays and ritualistic issues,
marriage and divorce, and ﬁnancial matters. One entire volume (Zeraim) is devoted to the rules of farming,
which in itself provides evidence that Eretz Israel was mainly a farming society at that time (Neusner 1998).
4or/and does not teach his sons the Torah” (Oppenheimer 1977). The transformation of the
religion created the need for the devoted Jews to be literate and, more important, to make
their children literate. To be an “am ha-aretz letorah” i naJ e w i s hc o m m u n i t ym e a n tt ob e
considered an outcast, which involved a social penalty.
The change in religious preferences brought by the shift in leadership from the Sadducees
to the Pharisees should be viewed as exogenous, and is the main assumption of the model.
3 A Model of Education and Conversion of Farmers
The basic setup is a two-period overlapping generations model with no population growth.8
An individual is assumed to live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period, he is a child (son) living
with (and maybe working for) his family and receiving religion-related education es.I nt h e
second period, the child becomes an adult with education level e, who decides whether to
keep or change his religion r (j = Jewish, n = non-Jewish), and the education level of his
children.
Before the educational reform within Judaism (up to 200 C.E.), Jews and non-Jews
are assumed to have the same level of education and income. After the religious reform,
the Jewish people are assumed to derive higher utility from their children’s and their own
Hebrew literacy (education). Speciﬁcally, a Jewish individual receives an exogenous taste
parameter (an attachment index), x>0, which weights the value of belonging to the
Jewish (“reformed”) religion in the utility function. The taste parameter is equal to 0 for
an individual whose father is non-Jewish (either because born non-Jewish or because he
had converted).
Like Iannaccone (1992), we assume that utility comes from consumption and religious
participation.9 The utility of an adult individual has the following simple structure:
Jewish individual : uj(c,es;e,x)=l o gc + x(e +1 ) es −  h (1)
Jewish individual who converts : ujn(c,es;e,x)= l o g c − πx (2)
Non-Jewish individual : un(c,es;e,x =0 )=l o gc. (3)
where c is family consumption.
8The no population growth hypothesis ﬁts the well known fact that the world population did not signiﬁ-
cantly grow during the ﬁrst millennium (Kremer 1993). Also, it would be straightforward to include fertility
as an endogenous variable: the increased cost of raising children because of the religious requirement re-
garding education would make Jewish farmers have fewer children. This prediction (the decrease in the
Jewish population because of lower fertility) would complement the prediction regarding the decrease in the
Jewish population through conversions that we explore here. The main reason we do not make fertility an
endogenous variable is that there is no historical evidence showing that Jews had lower fertility rates after
the religious transformation of Judaism (see our discussion at page 14).
9The model can be modiﬁed to be like Iannaccone (1992)’s model of religion as a “club” whose size
is endogenously determined. The utility needs to be speciﬁed as a general concave function. Then, in
equilibrium the utility and the cost of education can depend on the Jewish population size.
5In (1), the educational reform within Judaism is captured by the interaction of the
preference parameter x with the level of education in the family; that is, the utility from
being a Jew is increasing with the individual’s education and his son’s education.10
The term  h captures the subsequent development within Judaism (third century on)
that imposed a social penalty on illiterate individuals (am ha-aretz). h =1if a Jewish
father chooses not to invest in his son’s education (es =0 ), and h =0otherwise. The
community penalty for an illiterate Jewish individual is equal to   > 0.11
If a Jewish individual converts (2 above), he does not get any utility from his and his
son’s education (yet, the education of both may still contribute in production). The term
πx represents the disutility from conversion (π ≥ 0).12 In contrast, the conversion of a
non-Jewish individual to Judaism is assumed to have zero cost.
The utility of a non-Jewish individual (3 above) depends only on family consumption
because non-Jewish religions in the ﬁrst millennium did not place any value on literacy.
An individual who follows the Jewish religious norm regarding children’s education has
to provide at least a minimum level emin > 0 to his son; otherwise, if 0 <e<e min,i ti sa s
if the education level is equal to 0. This minimum level represents the ability to read the
Torah. Without loss of generality, we normalize emin =1 .
The cost of investing in the son’s (religious) education is given by γ (es)
θ,w h e r eγ > 0
and θ > 1. The cost of providing the minimum level of education is then equal to γ,w h i c h
can be interpreted as the teacher’s salary and the cost of the books. It is possible that γ is
decreasing with the size of the Jewish community in a given location; for example, in larger
Jewish communities, each family will pay a smaller share of the teacher’s salary. From the
viewpoint of the child, γ can be interpreted as the child’s intellectual ability (with γ being
lower for high-ability children), and/or the opportunity cost of the time the child spends in
school instead of working on his family’s farm, and/or the cost of hiring a private teacher.13
Given the features of agriculture in the ﬁrst millennium, education does not aﬀect a
farmer’s productivity. Thus, all farmers earn the same wage, equal to the constant wF.A
farmer spends his income on family consumption, children’s education, and a tax τrF that
10The speciﬁcation above implies that if es =0 , the adult individual does not get any utility from belonging
to the Jewish religion. This is an extrem version of the model, but it captures the paramount importance
of educating children in Judaism after the educational reform.
11  can be made an increasing function of the proportion of educated Jews in the community. This
assumption, which Robert Barro suggested to us, would enhance the conversion result we derive below.
It would also make the model closer to Iannaccone (1992)’s model if one solves for the size of the Jewish
community in the static model. An alternative way to endogenize the social penalty for illiterate people
is to have the Jewish religious leaders set the level of   that maximizes the size of the Jewish educated
community in the static model. These extensions aﬀect the proportion of educated individuals in the Jewish
rural population in the static framework but not the dynamic implications on the reduction of the Jewish
population in the long run, which is the main goal of our model.
12The inclusion of the disutility from conversion is not essential for our main result but it helps interpreting
the data in view of the model.
13By making γ a decreasing function and   an increasing function of the number of Jewish children in
school, in the static framework one can analyze the implications on the incentives to live in large and/or
wealthy Jewish communities, as well as the optimal community penalty that maximizes the proportion of
educated Jewish individuals–the goal of the religious leaders in Talmudic times.
6depends on religion and occupation. As such, a farmer’s budget constraint is,
c + γ(es)θ + τrF ≤ wF. (4)
Education. From (3) and (4), the optimal choice for non-Jewish farmers is not to
educate their sons (e∗
s =0 ) given that the son’s education does not provide any beneﬁt
(neither in utility nor in production).
To solve for the optimal level of sons’ education for Jewish farmers, let the budget
constraint (4) hold with equality. Then, the optimal level of es is given by,
e∗
s =0if x(e +1 )<
γθ
wF − γ − τjF and x(e +1 )< log[
wF − τjF
wF − γ − τjF ] −   (5)
e∗
s ≥ 1 otherwise, and e∗
s solves the equation x(e +1 )=
γθ(es)θ−1
wF − γ(es)θ − τjF . (6)
The ﬁrst condition in (5) is because of the corner solution at es =1 . The second inequality
is because of the condition that the utility of a Jewish individual with es =0has to be
larger than that with es =1 .14 The two conditions give testable implications on children’s
education. Jewish fathers do not invest in their sons’ education (i) if the marginal cost of
providing basic Jewish education (γθ) is large, and/or (ii) if the level of family consumption
(wF − γ − τrF) when the minimum level of education (es =1 ) is provided, is low. When
do (i) and (ii) occur?
At the community level, γ is large in small Jewish communities. It is also large when the
aggregate economic conditions in a given community are bad. At the same time, negative
aggregate shocks will drive agricultural incomes (wF) down, which in turn will bring family
consumption so low that it would make it almost impossible to invest in sons’ education.
At the individual level, families with low ability sons (γ large), or families whose op-
portunity costs of sending the sons to school instead of having them work on the farms are
high (again, large γ), will be less likely to invest in sons’ education. Also, fathers with low
levels of attachment to Judaism (low x) or who are themselves less educated (low e), will
be less likely to educate their children.
Conversion. A Jewish farmer converts if his utility as a Jewish individual is lower





s)θ − τjF)+x(e +1 ) e∗
s −  h<log(wF − τnF) − πx
where a Jewish farmer’s utility is evaluated at the optimal level of his child’s education e∗
s
as discussed above. Suppose that τjF = τnF. There are three cases.
14It should be noted that the model could be simpliﬁed by assuming that education for farmers is a discrete
choice of either zero or one. Then, e
∗
s =0 if x(e+1)< log[
wF −τjF
wF −γ−τjF ]− , and all the implications discussed
above hold. We prefer modeling education as a continuous variable mainly for the sake of equivalence with
the model for Jewish merchants that is presented later.
7(i) Jewish farmers whose parameters (wF,γ,θ,x) are such that they do educate their
sons (e∗
s ≥ 1), do not convert even if π =0 ,a suj(c,e∗
s ≥ 1;e,x) >u jn(c,e∗
s =0 ;e,x).
(ii) Jewish farmers whose parameters (wF,γ,θ,x) are such that they do not educate
their sons (e∗
s =0 ), convert if 0 ≤ πx ≤  .
(iii) Jewish farmers whose parameters (wF,γ,θ,x) are such that they do not educate
their sons (e∗
s =0 ), do not convert if πx> .
Thus, heterogeneity across individuals (diﬀerent x, e,a n dγ) and changes in aggregate
economic conditions over time (a change in wF, τrF, or γ) provide testable implications on
conversions.
First, at a given point in time, because of the heterogeneity across individuals there is
a proportion of Jewish farmers who educate their sons and do not convert, a proportion of
Jewish farmers who do not educate their children but do not convert, and a proportion of
Jewish farmers who do not educate their children and convert. This, by itself, reduces the
Jewish rural population in any period. Also, conversions are more numerous when aggregate
economic conditions are bad (low wF,h i g hτrF), and in small communities (high γ).15,16
Second, in the long-run Judaism cannot survive in a subsistence farming society as the
Jewish rural population is shrinking because of conversions. This process can be halted in
two ways: (i) if Jewish farmers can migrate to locations with better economic conditions
and/or larger Jewish communities where the cost of educating the children is lower, and (ii)
if increased urbanization and the expansion of trade make available to the literate Jewish
farmers high-skill occupations that provide positive returns to education.
4 Jewish Farmers Before the Eighth Century
We show that the historical evidence is consistent with the model’s assumptions and pre-
dictions.
Education. From the ﬁrst throughout the seventh century, the majority (about 80—
90 percent) of the Jewish population in Eretz Israel, Mesopotamia, and North Africa was
engaged in farming exactly as the non-Jewish population (Botticini and Eckstein 2005, Table
1). In a predominantly rural economy, the investment in children’s education as Judaism
required after the religious reform, should be viewed as a religious sacriﬁce without any
economic return (Iannaccone 1992; and Berman 2000). To the farmers it provided no beneﬁt
in terms of higher productivity and earnings. It was costly both at the community level
as the entire community had to bear some expenses (e.g., the construction of a synagogue
in a village), and also at the individual level. Safrai (1994, p. 125) has estimated that
in Roman Palestine, food expenses amounted to about 40-50 percent of a family’s total
15If cognitive skills are inherited from fathers to sons, our work would share some of the features of Galor
and Moav (2002)’s model of natural selection.
16With the additional assumption that cognitive skills are inherited, one obtains the prediction that in
the long run, the Jews would have higher than average cognitive abilities. Consistent with this predic-
tion, Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending (2005) maintain that there is genetic evidence supporting a natural
selection argument to explain the higher than average cognitive abilities of Ashkenazi Jews.
8expenses. With taxes taking an additional 30 percent, little was left to buy other items
such as clothing, books, and paying for the teacher’s salary.
Table 1 presents data on the cost of living consistent with Safrai’s estimates.
Tdeoh 1–Crvw ri Llylqj (lq ghqdull), 1vw—3ug Chqwxulhv C.E.
Items in a household budget Eretz Israel Egypt Babylon
Monthly wage of an agricultural worker 24—48 4—32 72—96
Monthly wage of an urban skilled worker 48—72 6—40 –
Monthy wage of a boy on farm work – 2—10 –
Monthly bread expenses (family of 4 people) 10—20 5—10 –
Cattle (ox or cow) 100—200 15—100 –
Suit/cloak 30 – –
Monthly rent of a house 4 – –
Book 200 – 80—120
Source: We put the data in Sperber (1965, 1966) in the same unit of account (denarii).
Note: The range of values indicate (i) the diﬀerent ﬁgures mentioned in primary sources, and (ii)
the increase in wages and prices from the ﬁrst to the third century.
Some clear patterns emerge from these data. First, farmers’ incomes were close to
subsistence levels and lower than those of urban skilled workers. Second, food exhausted
a substantial part of a farmer’s income. Third, the investment in children’s education was
costly. The opportunity cost of sending a boy to school was large (in ﬁrst-century Egypt, a
b o ye a r n e dm o r et h a n2denarii per month on farm work–half the cost of providing bread
for a family of four people for a month). Moreover, books were expensive. In fact, books
remained very expensive until the invention of the movable type printing in the 1440s.17
Despite education being very costly and “useless” in production for farmers, there is
evidence from two independent sources that religious instruction and primary education
were becoming more and more spread among the Jewish communities in Eretz Israel and
Mesopotamia.18 In addition to the many rulings and discussions in the Talmud regarding
schools, synagogues, and teachers, there is the wealth of archeological discoveries on syn-
agogues, of which Table 2 presents a sample. Of the more than one hundred synagogues
found, the largest number was built from the third to the ﬁfth centuries in villages and rural
communities in Judaea, Galilee, and the Golan.19 The existence of synagogues in many lo-
17Van Zanden (2005, Figures 4 and 5) has estimated that in 1450, a printed Bible cost about the equivalent
of the annual wage of a laborer. Around 1780, the cheapest Bible cost only the equivalent of the daily wage
of a carpenter. The drop in the real price of books was even more dramatic: in 1800, real book prices were
10 percent of what they have been in 1470.
18See Botticini and Eckstein (2005) for a detailed and extensive discussion of the implementation of the
Jewish educational reform from the second to the eighth centuries. The historical evidence on standards of
living, the cost of education, and the archeological ﬁndings on synagogues, which we present in this section,
are new and in addition to the evidence discussed in Botticini and Eckstein (2005).
19The growth in the number of synagogues occurred even though the economic conditions in Eretz Israel
were deteriorating and some Jews were migrating to Mesopotamia (Safrai 1976a, pp. 343—44). Synagogues
were also built in many locations in the diaspora (Levine 1999).
9cations is very important as other sources (e.g., the Talmud) document that synagogues at
that time were primarily a place where children and adults read and learned the Torah.20
Tdeoh 2—Sdpsoh ri S|qdjrjxhv lq Euhw} Ivudho, 200—550 C.E.
Century Locations Region
3rd Bar’am, Gush Halav, Horvat Shema, Kefar Kana, Nevoraya Galilee
En-Gedi, Eshtemoa Judea
3rd—4th Chorazin, Gush Halav, Hammat Gader, Hammath Tiberias, Galilee
Khirbet Shema, Maoz Hayyim, Meiron, Nabratein, Rehov Galilee
Horvat Sumaqa Carmel range
Horvat Rimmon Judea
4th Arbel, Capernaum, Horvat ha-Amudim, Meroth Galilee
Beth Alpha, Beth Shean, Maoz Hayim Beth-Shean Valley
Gaza, Horvat Susiya, Naaran Judea
Zumimra Lower Golan
3rd—5th Anim, Aphik, Dabbura, Kefar Hananiah Golan
5th Assalieh, En Neshut, Horvat Kanef, Katzrin, Lower Golan
5th Huseifa, Hirbet Amudim, Yiaﬁa, Sepphoris Galilee
6th Dabiya, Horvat Dikke, Umm el-Kanatir Lower Golan
Sources: Levine (1982; 2000), Hachlili (1989), Stern (1993), and Urman and Flesher (1995).
The same archeological evidence is not available for Mesopotamia, but one can infer the
existence of synagogues there from the many references in the Talmud (Gafni 1995).21
At the same time, the many quotes in the Mishna and Talmud against the ammei
ha-aretz indicate that some Jews chose not to educate their sons.
The historical evidence ﬁts very well the predictions of the model regarding education.
Facts and narrative accounts from diﬀerent sources conﬁrm that, while some Jewish farmers
did not invest in their children’s education, an increasingly larger share of the Jewish rural
population decided to follow the religious norm regarding children’s education despite their
low standards of living.
The spread of literacy among the Jewish rural population is even more impressive when
compared to the literacy rates of the non-Jewish rural population in the same period (third
to eighth century C.E.). In the Roman, Byzantine, Christian, and Persian worlds there was
no mandatory primary education, and the non-Jewish rural populationw a sa l m o s te n t i r e l y
illiterate.22 Even in 1500, the share of the literate population in most of western Europe
was no more than 10 percent (Reis 2004).
20See Safrai S. (1976b), Safrai Z. (1987; 1995), Oppenheimer (1995), Urman (1995), and Schiﬀman (1999).
21From the third to the sixth century, the scholars (Amoraim) in the academies in Eretz Israel and
Babylon discussed the Oral Torah and clariﬁed the rulings in the Mishna. Their work became codiﬁed in
the Talmud Yerushalmi (the Talmud of the Land of Israel) in the late fourth century, and the Talmud Bavli
(the Babylonian Talmud) in the early sixth century.
22In the Roman Empire, primary schools were widespread in the cities but primary education was neither
compulsory nor universal. The lower socio-economic groups in the cities and the rural folks were illiterate
(Marrou 1982, chapters 4 and 7). There is no information on primary education in Iran and Iraq under the
Parthian and Sasanian rulers.
10Conversions. The main prediction of the model is that some Jewish farmers convert
to other religions as a result of the implementation of the costly educational reform in
Judaism. The key evidence supporting this implication comes from the size of the Jewish
population, which went from about 4.5 million in the ﬁrst century (with the three main
centers being in Eretz Israel, Mesopotamia, and Egypt) to about 1.2—1.5 million in the
sixth century (Table 3).23
Tdeoh 3—Dlvwulexwlrq ri wkh Jhzlvk Prsxodwlrq (lq Mloolrq)
Time
Location 0-65 C.E. 66-130 135—300 6th century
Eretz Israel 2.5a 1.7b 0.7c 0.2d
Mesopotamia, Persia 1 1 1.2 0.8—1
Egypt, North Africa 1 0.1e very few very few
Syria many many some few
Asia Minor, Balkansf many many some few
Roman Empireg some some some –
Western Europeg – – – very few
Total Jewish Population 4.5—5.0 3—3.5 2—2.5 1.2—1.5
Total Populationh 59 59 55 48
Jewish Population
Total Population (%) 7.0 6.0 4.5 3.0
Sources: For Mesopotamia, Neusner (1965—1970, vol. 1, pp. 14-15, vol. 2, pp. 246-48), and Issawi
(1981, pp. 376, 381). For Eretz Israel, Herr and Oppenheimer (1990, pp. 108-9), Hamel (1990, pp.
137—40). For Egypt, Issawi (1981, pp. 376, 381), and Musallam (1981, p. 432). For data on Jewish
population in all locations, Baron (1971), and DellaPergola (2001, Tables 1 and 2). For data on
total population, Clark (1968), McEvedy and Jones (1978), and Kremer (1993).
a Out of 2.5 million people, about 2.2 million were Jews and 300,000 were Samaritans. In addition,
there were about 500,000 Greeks, pagans, and other ethnic groups.
b The death toll from the revolt of 66—70 C.E. amounted to about 600,000 Jews.
c The death toll from the revolt of 135 C.E. amounted to about 500,000 Jews.
d The total population in Eretz Israel was about 1.1 million people, and most were Christians.
e The ﬁgure refers to the Jewish population in Egypt after 115, when the crushing of the rebellion
against the Roman Empire almost completely wiped out the Jewish community there.
f Asia Minor and Balkans include Turkey and Greece.
g The Roman Empire mainly consists of western Europe given that in the Table we consider sepa-
rately the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa.
h The ﬁgures include only the areas where the Jews lived at this time (Eretz Israel, Mesopotamia,
Persia, Egypt and North Africa, Syria, Asia Minor, the Balkans, and western Europe).
23For population data in the ﬁrst millennium, we rely on the works of leading historians and demogra-
phers. We also greatly beneﬁted from a very helpful discussion with Sergio DellaPergola. While there is
disagreement among scholars on speciﬁc numbers, there is a general consensus on the trends and the relative
size of the populations in selected locations at given times. The numbers should be considered as ranges
of values, instead of exact ﬁgures. We agree with DellaPergola’s estimate of 4.5 million Jews in the ﬁrst
century, which is an intermediate value between the 2—3 million estimate suggested by some scholars (e.g.,
Hamel [1990]) and the 8 million estimate proposed by Baron (1971).
11Three factors could generate this large population reduction: death rates from massacres
or demographic shocks (famines, epidemics, etc), conversions out of Judaism, and lower
fertility rates in the centuries following the religious transformation.24
Massacres explain most of the huge reduction in the Jewish community in Egypt, which
went from about 1 million to few thousands after the revolt in 115 was crushed by the
Roman emperor Trajan.25
In Eretz Israel the Jewish population shrank from about 2.5 million (including 300,000
Samaritans) at the beginning of the ﬁrst century to only 200,000 by the sixth century.
Again, deaths explain a signiﬁcant part of this reduction. Both the Jewish writer Flavius
Josephus and the Roman historian Tacitus maintain that the death toll of the rebellion
against Rome in 66-70 amounted to about 600,000 Jews.26 Less than a century later, the
death toll of the Bar Kokhba revolt in 135 C.E. was in the range of about 500,000 Jews.27
Overall, the massacres following the revolts in the ﬁrst and second centuries account for a
reduction of more than 1 million Jews in Eretz Israel.28
After these revolts, many Jews migrated to Mesopotamia, as one can see from the
increasing size of the Jewish population in the Near East in the second and third centuries.
However, these migrations are not enough to explain the additional reduction of more than
one million Jews in Eretz Israel from the ﬁrst to the sixth century. We show that once
the Jewish religion became centered around the reading and learning of the Torah in the
synagogue, voluntary conversions out of Judaism occurred and they explain the rest of the
reduction in the Jewish population in Eretz Israel in the ﬁrst half of the millennium.29
The ﬁrst group who departed from Judaism were th ee a r l yJ e w i s hc o n v e r t st oC h r i s t i a n -
ity. Under the inﬂuence of Paul’s doctrine, instead of knowledge and obedience to the Law,
faith became the main requirement for being a devoted Christian (Neusner 1990). Until
the destruction of the Temple, Jewish leaders held ambivalent feelings toward the Jewish
Christian sects, but overall the trend was one of tolerance. However, after the Bar Kokhba
revolt in 135, the Jewish scholars in the academies declared the various sects of Jewish
Christians outside the Jewish fold.
In a very detailed work on the spread of Christianity, Harnack (1908, vol. 2, pp. 89—
306) provided a long list of speciﬁc settlements in Eretz Israel, Syria, Egypt, Asia Minor,
Armenia, Edessa, Greece, and the Roman Empire where Jewish converts to Christianity
could be traced before 325 C.E. He maintained that in the ﬁrst three centuries, outside
Eretz Israel Christianity spread primarily in locations where there were large Jewish settle-
ments of mixed racial composition, including Hellenistic Jews and pagans or descendants
of former pagans who had converted to Judaism in earlier times. Both Jewish and non-
24Although there is no direct evidence on mortality rates due to famines and epidemics for the Jews in
the ﬁrst millennium, none of the sources we consulted mentions the reduction in Jewish family size due to
Malthusian positive checks in the ﬁrst millennium.
25Safrai (1976, pp. 370—73).
26The Samaritans sided with the Romans and the crushing of the rebellion did not aﬀect them.
27Baron (1971, pp. 870—75), and Herr and Oppenheimer (1990, p. 109).
28T h en u m b e ro fk n o w nJ e w i s hs e t t l e m e n t ss h r a n kf r o mm o r et h a n2 0 0t ol e s st h a n5 0b e t w e e n1 3 5a n d
640 C.E. See Avi-Yonah (1976, p. 20).
29The documented episodes of forced conversions are not large enough to account for all the Jews who
converted in the ﬁrst half of the millennium.
12Jewish sources indicate that most early Jewish converts to Christianity were uneducated,
low income Jews.30,31
Conversions of Jews to Christianity must have continued in the ﬁf t ha n ds i x t hc e n t u r i e s
if in 426 C.E., an imperial decree in the Roman Empire established the annulment of
any Jewish will in which a baptized son, daughter or grandchild, were disinherited. The
Theodosian Code in 438 went even further by decreeing the death penalty by ﬁre for Jews
who harmed Jewish converts to Christianity.32 Gil (1992, p. 222) states that in the early
Byzantine period, many Jewish farmers in Palestine converted to Christianity.
The second group who increasingly separated from the Jewish religion in Eretz Israel was
the Samaritans. In about 200 C.E., there were about 300,000 Samaritans but the community
shrank to no more than a few thousands by the seventh century. What separated the
Samaritans from the Jewish community was the fact that the Samaritans kept considering
sacriﬁces the core of the religion, accepted only the Pentateuch (the ﬁrst ﬁve books of the
Bible) as the sole source of religious law, refused the Oral Torah developed by the scholars
in the academies, and never codiﬁed their canon law into a Mishna. Some Jewish scholars
in the second century were still considering the Samaritans as belonging to the Jewish fold.
But rabbi Judah ha-Nassi and later scholars equated them to Gentiles. In the Talmudic
period, Jewish scholars debated whether the Samaritans were to be considered haverim
or ammei ha-aretz. 33 Like for Jewish farmers, Gil (1992, p. 222) maintains that many
Samaritan farmers converted to Christianity during the Byzantine period.
There were also conversions of Jews to Christianity in fourth-century Mesopotamia
(Neusner 1965—1970, vol. 4, p. 435). Christians became as numerous as the Jews there,
and a certain proportion of these Christians must have been converted Jews given that
in Babylon there were no attempts to forcibly convert pagans to Christianity as in the
Byzantine Empire (Gil 1997, vol. 1, p. 57).
Despite conversions to Christianity, the size of the Jewish community in Mesopotamia
remained roughly constant from the ﬁrst to the sixth century (Table 3) because of the
migrations of Jewish farmers prompted by the deteriorating economic conditions in Eretz
Israel from the third to the ﬁfth centuries. At that time, Babylon became the center of
Jewish religious and economic life. Jewish religious leaders discouraged this migratory
movement but they partly failed to convince many Jews not to leave Palestine.34 These
migrations occurred at the same time when some Jewish farmers in Eretz Israel and Babylon
started investing in their children’s religious education and when conversions out of Judaism
were occurring in the Jewish rural population in both Eretz Israel and Babylon.
30See Harnack (1908, vol. 1, p. 47; vol. 2, pp. 33-34) and Baron (1952, vol. 2, pp. 163—66) for the
primary sources that are used to support this claim.
31As for conversions of non-Jews into Judaism, the model predicts no conversions of non-Jews to Judaism
after the religious/educational reform. There were conversions of pagans to Judaism before the revolts in the
ﬁrst century C.E. (Baron 1952, vol. 1, pp. 173—76). In contrast, after the third century people converted to
Judaism only by coercion, such as in the case of slaves owned by Jews. On the attitudes of Jewish religious
leaders towards conversions and proselityzing, see the insightful work of Cohen (1999).
32See Baron (1937, vol. 2, p. 253), and Alon (1984, p. 753).
33For details on the history of the Samaritans, see Montgomery (1968, chapters 4—9), Herr and Oppen-
heimer (1990, p. 204), and Alon (1984, p. 745).
34Baron (1952, vol. 2, p. 204—14), and Herr and Oppenheimer (1990, pp. 133-35).
13The historical evidence of conversions and the demographic data are consistent with the
prediction of our model that conversions occurred mainly among uneducated, low income
Jewish farmers in the ﬁrst half of the millennium. That process was slow and Jewish leaders
were not concerned with the conversions of the ammei ha-aretz to other religions since they
were outcast anyway.
Lastly, there is a third factor that might have brought a large reduction in the Jewish
population in the centuries following the transformation of Judaism: a reduction in the fer-
tility rate in order to implement the religious ruling of educating the children in a subsistence
economy. To the best of our knowledge, there is no historical evidence showing that Jewish
households reduced their fertility following the transformation of Judaism into a religion
focused on reading and learning. The Mishna and the Talmud contain an endless number of
detailed discussions and rulings regarding marriage, sexual behavior among spouses, preg-
nancy, abortion, infertility, divorce, and the Biblical requirement that the very purpose of
marriage is to fulﬁll the Biblical commandment “be fruitful and multiply” (peru urevu).
Among these many discussions and rules, there is none regarding reducing the number of
children in order to fulﬁil the religious ruling of educating the children. If this had been a
major problem in the Jewish communities in Talmudic times, somehow it would have been
brought in front of the scholars and rabbis in the yeshiva, would have been discussed and
would ﬁnd its way in the Talmud.35
5 Occupational Dynamics: From Farmers to Merchants, 8th-
9th Centuries
Given the stagnant economies in the late Roman, early Byzantine, and Persian Empires in
the fourth-seventh centuries, the growing number of educated Jewish farmers could not ﬁnd
skilled occupations in the existing cities at that time.36
But in the eighth—ninth centuries, urbanization greatly expanded in the newly estab-
lished Muslim Empire (Lewis 1984). New cities were founded in Iraq and Persia. The
Umayyad dynasty, which had its capital in Damascus, established as main centers Basra in
636 and Kufa in 638, whereas the Abbasid rulers developed Baghdad in 762 and Samarra
in 836. The population of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries was in the range of
600,000 to 1 million people, whereas the largest European cities in the late twelfth century
(e.g., Palermo, Paris, Seville, Venice, Granada, and Cordoba) had populations in the range
of 60,000 to 150,000 people (Table 4).
35Work by demographer Sergio DellaPergola (1997) has also shown that the Jewish people anticipated by
about one century the demographic transition that the rest of the European population underwent in the
late 19
th century. This means that the Jewish birth rate started declining only around the late 18
th century.
36See Neusner (1965—1970) and Avi-Yonah (1976) for the stagnant and worsened economic conditions in
the Roman, Byzantine, and Persian empires in the fourth—sixth centuries.
14Tdeoh 4—Uuedql}dwlrq lq wkh Nhdu Edvw dqg Exursh
Iraq, Persia, and Egypt in the 8th—9th centuries









Europe’s eight largest cities in the late 12th century









Sources: For total population in cities in Iraq and Persia, see Watson (1981, p. 56, footnote 45),
and Lapidus (1981, p. 203). For total and Jewish population in Cairo, see Ashtor (1976, p. 89).
For total population in European cities, see De Long and Shleifer (1993, Table 1, second column).
For the Jewish population in Iraq and Persia, see Gil (1997, pp. 487-530) and Benjamin of Tudela
(1170, henceforth BT). For the Jewish population in European cities, see BT.
Note: We agree with DellaPergola (2001) and interpret Tudela’s numbers as the number of Jewish
households in each city. Based on the evidence from the documents of the Cairo Geniza, the average
family size was 5 people per household. Therefore, we multiply the number of Jewish households
times 5 to obtain the number of Jewish people in a given city.
a BT lists 300 Jewish households (about 1,500 people) for Marseilles.
b BT lists 20 Jewish households (about 100 people) for nearby Pisa.
The growth of new cities, towns, and administrative centers in the Muslim Near East
vastly increased the demand for urban and skilled occupations. The literate Jewish rural
population in Iraq and later in all the Muslim Empire moved to urban centers, aban-
doned agriculture, and became engaged in a wide range of crafts, trade, moneylending,
tax-farming, and the medical profession.37 This occupational transition took about 150
years and by 900, almost all Jews in Iraq, Persia, Syria, and Egypt, were engaged in urban
37Here we summarize the detailed description of the occupational transition presented in Botticini and
Eckstein (2005). In Table 4 above, however, we present data on urbanization not available in the other
paper.
15occupations.38
In these cities, the Jewish population became very large to the extent that about 1
million Jews (80 percent of world Jewry) lived in hundreds of cities and towns in eighth-
century Mesopotamia, with Baghdad alone hosting a large Jewish community of about
200,000 people (Gil 1997, p. 458).
While the most educated Jews (the scholars in the academies) had left agriculture and
become merchants well before t h ee x p a n d e du r b a n i z a t i o ni nI r a qa n dP e r s i a ,t h el i t e r a t e
Jewish rural population left agriculture only when the growth of cities in the Muslim Empire
made available to them skilled occupations, in which the returns to their investment in
literacy and education were high.
Since Jews, Christians, and other non-Muslim minorities could engage in any occupa-
tion in the Muslim Empire, the distinctive characteristic of the Jews–their endogenously
determined higher literacy and education–gave them the comparative advantage to switch
to the better paid occupations in the new cities, whereas most non-Jews remained farm-
ers (Baron 1952; Gil 1997).39 This occupational selection into urban, skilled occupations
remained the distinctive mark of the Jewish people thereafter.
6 A Model of Education and Conversion of Merchants
We now present a simple model of education and conversion of merchants by extending the
model of farmers described in Section 3. The only diﬀerence between farmers and merchants
is that education positively aﬀect a merchant’s productivity and earnings, that is,
wM(e,es)=wF[1 + Aeα
se1−α], (8)
and, therefore, his budget constraint is given by,
c + γ(es)θ + τrM ≤ wF[1 + Aeα
se1−α] (9)
where e and es are deﬁned as above, A is an exogenous productivity parameter, and τrM is
the tax paid by a merchant with religion r. We analyze only the case of literate merchants as
the optimization problem of illiterate merchants is the same as the one of illiterate farmers.
Education. The main prediction of the model regarding education is that Jewish
merchants invest more than non-Jewish merchants in children’s education. Consider the
ﬁrst-order condition which gives the optimal level of a child’s education for any merchant
(Jewish or non-Jewish),




wM − γ(es)θ − τrM ≤ 0. (10)
38Ashtor (1959, pp. 147—51), Goitein (1967—1988, vol. 1), and Gil (1997, vol. 1). Goitein enumerated
about 265 occupations mentioned in the documents of the Cairo Geniza.
39At this time, there were many minorities living in Iraq, including Christians who were almost equal in
numbers to Jews (Gil 1997, vol. 1, p. 57).
16Consider ﬁrst the steady-state education level (e = es = e∗) of non-Jewish merchants
(who by deﬁnition have the exogenous taste parameter for Judaism x =0 ). Then, from
equation (10), e = es = e∗ =[ wFAα
θγ ]1/(θ−1). In the steady-state, non-Jewish merchants
educate their sons (i.e., e∗ ≥ emin =1 )if the parameters satisfy the condition that wFAα ≥
γθ, that is, if the marginal product of education is greater than, or equal to, the marginal
cost of education at es = e = emin =1 . The better are the aggregate economic conditions,
the higher are the earnings of merchants (wFAα) and, hence, the more likely is that both
non-Jewish and Jewish merchants will invest in their sons’ education.
Let us assume that, before the educational reform in Judaism, the education levels of
both Jewish and non-Jewish merchants are positive (e ≥ 1). Education has a positive eﬀect
on merchants’ productivity and earnings regardless of which religion a merchant belongs
to. However, after the religious transformation of Judaism, Jewish merchants will invest
in their children’s education comparatively more than non-Jewish merchants because they
also derive direct utility from children’s education at the rate x.40
Conversion. The main insight of the model regarding conversion is that if there is
small or no tax diﬀerence between Jewish and non-Jewish merchants, no Jewish merchant
converts. Only if taxes on Jewish merchants are signiﬁcantly higher, then Jewish merchants
with low levels of attachment to Judaism (low x) convert. Hence, given that some Jewish
farmers convert (see Section 3) and Jewish merchants do not (unless the tax diﬀerential is
very high), the model predicts that over time, the proportion of merchants in the Jewish
population will increase.
Formally, a literate Jewish merchant (ej ≥ 1) converts if the utility of remaining a
Jewish individual is lower than the utility of becoming a non-Jewish individual, that is,










t ) − πx.
Assuming that the level of education of Jewish merchants before the religious reform (e∗)
is greater than, or equal to, 1, equation (11) implies that if taxes on Jewish and non-Jewish
merchants are the same (τnM = τjM), a literate Jewish merchant does not convert.
T os e et h a t ,l e tu ss t a r tﬁr s tw i t ht h ee x t r e m ec a s eo fx =0 , in which the Jewish
individual places no value on the educational requirement established by Judaism. Then,
from (11), a Jewish merchant will choose to invest in his son’s education (e
j
s)e x a c t l ya sa
non-Jewish merchant (en
s), and, therefore, he will be indiﬀerent regarding conversion since
he derives the same utility as a Jewish and as a non-Jewish individual.
As the attachment index to Judaism x increases, the utility from being Jewish is increas-
ing with the education level of the child e
j
s, and therefore, a Jewish merchant who educates
his children, will not convert. Moreover, the higher the attachment index to Judaism x,t h e
greater is the cost of conversion (πx), and hence, no Jewish merchant will convert if the tax
diﬀerential between Jewish and non-Jewish individuals is zero or small.
40See equation (1).
177 Jewish Education and Conversion, 9th to 12th Centuries
We show that the historical evidence from the Muslim period is consistent with the model’s
predictions.
Education. When urbanization greatly expanded in the Muslim Near East and many
Jews entered urban skilled occupations, primary education became almost universal among
them (Goitein 1962).41 The two main sources of information are the Responsa of the
Geonim and the documents of the Cairo Geniza. The Responsa (teshuvot) are the written
replies that the Geonim, the heads of the academies in Mesopotamia, sent to the letters
they received from Jews everywhere, who asked for their advise on religious, economic, and
family-related matters. The existence and extent of the Responsa is by itself evidence of the
spread of literacy among Jews. Many Responsa, even from villages, referred to schooling
and teachers. Other Responsa indicate that in synagogues Jewish children learned the
Hebrew and Arabic scripts, as well as arithmetic, and that even non-Jewish families were
interested in sending their children to synagogues to learn non-religious topics.42
The other impressive source of historical evidence consists of the thousands of letters,
contracts, wills, and written transactions from the documents of the Cairo Geniza, which
conﬁrm the universality of primary education documented in the Responsa, but on a larger
scale.43 The budgets, letters, and contracts of wealthy and humble households even from
small towns and villages contain an endless number of references to teachers and school
fees. In addition to the school fees for his own children (2 dirhems per month per child),
each household head was required to pay an education tax to ﬁnance the primary education
of orphan and/or poor children.44 Records from Old Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, and
Baghdad mention “teachers of the orphans” supported by this communal tax.45
T h eh i s t o r i c a le v i d e n c ei sa l s oc o n s i s t e n tw ith the model’s prediction that non-Jewish
merchants also invested in their children’s education but less than Jews. To spread the
new religion, the Muslim rulers promoted the establishment of primary schools (Maktab
or Kuttab), and by the end of the eighth century, there was a fairly widespread system of
primary schools.46 Providing a child with primary education, however, was not a religious
law. The Muslim rulers also founded institutions of higher learning (academies) but only
from the eleventh century–more than six centuries after the establishment of the Jewish
academies in Iraq.
41In Botticini and Eckstein (2005) we present detailed evidence to support this claim. Here we only
summarize the main facts.
42Assaf (1925—1942, vol. 2, pp. 11—27), and Goitein (1962).
43The documents of the Cairo Geniza were found in the basement of a synagogue in Fustat (Old Cairo,
Egypt) where they had been housed for centuries because the name of God was written at the beginning of
each document, and therefore, they could not be thrown away. Based on these documents, Schlomo Goitein
(1967-1988) wrote a monumental work on the social and economic life of the Jewish communities in the
Mediterranean and the Muslim lands from the 10th to the 13th centuries.
44A teacher’s average salary was 80 dirhems per month.
45Goitein (1967—1988, vol. 2, pp. 174—93).
46See Nakosteen (1964, pp. 44-47). Especially in early times, Jewish and Christians teachers were recruited
to teach non-religious matters in Muslim schools.
18Conversions. Table 5 shows that no major change occurred in the size of world Jewry
in the Muslim period (8th to 12th centuries). This implies that conversions almost stopped
when the Jews became merchants, which is consistent with the main prediction of our
model.47 The poll tax (3.4 dirhems per month, about 5 percent of a teacher’s salary at
that time) levied on non-Muslims was not a big burden for Jewish craftsmen, merchants,
tax farmers, and doctors to prompt mass conversions among them.48
Tdeoh 5—Dlvwulexwlrq ri wkh Jhzlvk Prsxodwlrq (lq Mloolrq)
Time
Location 6th century 8th century Late 12th century
Eretz Israel 0.2 few 0.002
Iraq, Persia, Arabiaa 0.8-1 0.8-1 0.800
Egypt, North Africa very few 0.004 0.012
Syria few few 0.015
Balkans, eastern Europeb few few 0.047
Western Europec very few few 0.103
Total Jewish Population 1.2—1.5 1-1.2 1-1.2
Total Populationd 48 51 75
Jewish Population
World Population (%) 3.0 2.0 1.6
Sources: For Mesopotamia, Neusner (1965—1970, vol. 1, pp. 14-15, vol. 2, pp. 246-48), and Issawi
(1981, pp. 376, 381). For Eretz Israel, Herr and Oppenheimer (1990, pp. 108-09), Hamel (1990,
pp. 137—40). For Egypt, Ashtor (1967; 1968, p. 13; 1976, chapter 7), Issawi (1981, pp. 376, 381),
Musallam (1981, p. 432), and Dols (1981, p. 400—04). For data on Jewish population in all locations,
Baron (1971), and DellaPergola (2001, Tables 1 and 2). For data on total population, Clark (1968),
McEvedy and Jones (1978), and Kremer (1993).
a Arabia refers to the Arabian peninsula including Yemen.
b Balkans include Greece and Turkey. Eastern Europe includes Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Romania.
c Western Europe includes Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Germany, Low Countries, and England.
d The ﬁgures include only the areas where the Jews lived at this time (Eretz Israel, Mesopotamia,
Persia, Egypt and North Africa, Syria, the Balkans, eastern Europe, and western Europe).
Also, the few conversions of Jews occurred to Islam–the dominant religion in the Near
East–and not to other religions (e.g., Christianity). Hence, the very few conversions of
Jews employed in high skill urban occupations in the Muslim period were very diﬀerent
from the conversion to Christianity of many illiterate and low income Jewish farmers in the
ﬁrst half of the millennium in Eretz Israel and Mesopotamia, which were the outcome of
the implementation of the costly religious norm.
47One of the predictions of Rapoport and Weiss (forthcoming)’s model is consistent with this historical
fact.
48The poll tax was a burden for poor households, as indicated in some documents of the Cairo Geniza in
which the entire Jewish community in a given location had to help poor families pay the poll tax (Goitein
1967—1988, vol. 2, pp. 300—04).
198 Voluntary Diaspora, ca. 800—1250
The main insight of our thesis is that the educational requirement established by Judaism
could survive in the long run only if the Jews could ﬁnd occupations which provide high
returns to their investment in literacy and education. The migrations of Jewish people
within the Muslim Empire in the eighth-tenth centuries and then to western Europe in
the ninth-thirteenth centuries are an important historical development that supports this
argument.
The timing, pattern, and characteristics of the Jewish diaspora from East to West
indicate that the Jews had some distinctive features compared to other minorities within the
Muslim Empire, who did not migrate to western Europe despite the fact that no prohibitions
prevented them from doing so. We argue that the distinctive engine of the Jewish migrations
to the West was the incentive to maximize the returns to their investment in religious human
capital, which had spillover eﬀects on their general literacy and education.
The ability to read religious texts in Hebrew enabled the Jews to read any other doc-
uments written in Hebrew, such as business letters, contracts, loans, and sales, even if the
local languages they spoke were diﬀerent. In addition, the ability to read and write He-
brew helped Jewish craftsmen, merchants, and moneylenders learn other languages, which
heightened mobility and trading opportunities. This enabled the network externality among
Jewish merchants described by Greif (1989; 1993). Literacy was a pre-condition for the use
of community sanctions and the Jewish court system through (i) the written letters among
Jewish merchants as illustrated by the documents of the Cairo Geniza, and (ii) through
the rulings of the scholars in the academies in Iraq dispatched to the Jewish communities
everywhere through the mail system of the Jewish merchants, as documented by the huge
number of rabbinic Responsa.49
Education made mobility less costly since it enabled educated people to stay in touch
with each other, which was very valuable to maintain family and business connections
when living in diﬀerent and distant countries, as the historical evidence presented below
highlights.
Migrations Within the Muslim Empire. As shown earlier in Table 5, in the
seventh-eighth centuries the demographic, economic, and religious center of the Jewish
communities was the Near East under Muslim rule. Jews there abandoned agriculture and
moved to urban centers where they entered a wide range of urban and skilled occupations.
Within the Muslim Empire, the Jews voluntarily and freely moved from Iraq and Persia
to Yemen, the Arabian peninsula, Syria, Eretz Israel, Anatolia, Egypt and North Africa.
When the Muslim rulers overtook southern Spain by establishing the Cordoba Caliphate
from 711 to 1236, a fairly large number of Jews settled there.50 In 756, Cordoba was the
largest European city with a population of about 100,000. About two centuries later, it
had a total population of about half a million people, housed 70 libraries (the one of the
49Goitein (1967—1988, vol. 1), Ben Sasson (1976, pp. 393—402), and Gil (1997, vol. 1).
50In 1031, the Cordoba Caliphate was split into several kingdoms and for two centuries was under the
Almoravidi (Berber) rulers. It fell into Christians hands in 1236 and this ended the Muslim rule in this part
of Spain.
20caliph alone containing about 400,000 volumes), 80,000 shops, and was a wealthy commer-
cial economy belonging to a trading network that connected Constantinople, Alexandria,
Baghdad, and Damascus, all the way to India and China.51
The Jews who settled in Muslim Spain specialized in a very large set of crafts and
skilled occupations, held a dominant role in local trade, and gained almost a monopoly
in international trade. They also shared in the lively intellectual life that characterized
Muslim Spain at this time. A yeshiva (academy) was founded in 929 in Cordoba. The
establishment of the yeshivot in Muslim Spain created a gradual separation between the very
large Jewish community in Mesopotamia and Persia (about 800 thousand to one million)
and the comparatively smaller (about 100 thousand) but very wealthy and prominent Jewish
community in Muslim Spain (Baer 1961).
The combination of wealth, luxury, and thriving intellectual life of the Jews in Muslim
Spain is exempliﬁed by the life of rabbi Samuel ha-Nagid (Marcus 1938, pp. 297—300).
Living in early eleventh-century Cordoba, he was a merchant, a scholar, a poet, and later
became the chief minister at the court of Granada. He is one of the most prominent examples
of the type of Jewish individuals who contributed to the “golden age” in Jewish history (ca.
800 to 1200) (Raphael 1985). This period of spectacular intellectual fervor culminated
with the contribution of rabbi Moses ben Maimon (called Rambam or Maimonides) who,
born in Cordoba in 1131, later moved to Egypt where he became a court physician for
the ruler Salah al-Din. He radically reformed Judaism by opening it to other cultures and
philosophies. His teachings were accepted by all the Jews living in the Muslim Empire and
set the foundations of the Sephardic Jewry as a distinct Jewish community with respect to
the Ashkenazi Jewish communities in France, Germany, and England, as we will see below.
Migrations to Western Christian Europe. When the Jews settled in locations
within the Muslim Empire including Muslim Spain, they did not need any charter, per-
mission, or special privilege because non-Muslims could freely settle and engage in any
occupations as long as they paid the poll tax.
This is in striking contrast with their migrations to western Christian Europe from the
ninth to the thirteenth centuries. Their migrations there, exactly as the migrations of other
foreign craftsmen, merchants, and moneylenders (e.g., the Venetian or Genoese traders, the
Tuscan bankers, or the Flemish merchants), were regulated by kings, bishops, or local rulers
in special charters. Table 6 presents a sample of these early medieval charters to Jewish
traders, merchants, and moneylenders.
Despite the diﬀerent timing and characteristics of the Jewish diaspora in the European
countries, it is possible to list three main common features of these migrations.
First, until about 1250 the Jewish migrations to western Christian Europe were a vol-
untary process involving the most skilled and literate individuals. In the early stages, it
started with a single Jewish individual or family asking the local ruler or bishop to settle in
a given location. For example, the earliest charters in France were issued by the king Louis
I the Pious around 820-825 to three individual Jewish merchants (Pakter 1988, p. 96).
51Considering the size of other Jewish communities for which there are data (see Table 4), a reasonable
estimate is that about one to two thousand Jewish households lived in Cordoba at this time.
21Tdeoh 6—Sdpsoh ri Jhzlvk Ckduwhuv lq Whvwhuq Exursh, fd. 800-1250
Country City Year of charter Activities allowed and regulated
Own land Travel/Trade Moneylending
Spain Barcelona 1053-1071 yes yes yes
Sepulveda, Najera 1085 yes yes yes
Leon 1090 yes yes yes
Miranda de Ebro 1099 yes yes yes
Tudela 1116 silent yes yes
Catalayud 1134 yes yes yes
Salamanca 1170 yes yes yes
Cuenca 1177 yes yes yes
Zurita 1218 yes yes yes
Toledo 1222 yes yes yes
Valencia 1250 yes yes yes
France – ca. 820-825 yes yes silent
– 1190 silent silent yes
England – ca. 1120, 1170* yes yes yes
– 1190, 1201 yes yes yes
– 1275 yes yes no
Germany Speyer 1084, 1090 yes yes yes
Worms 1074 silent yes silent
Worms 1090, 1157 yes yes yes
Ratisbon 1182, 1216, 1230 yes yes silent
– 1236 yes yes yes*
Austria Vienna 1238 silent silent yes
Austria 1244 silent silent yes
Sources: Parkes (1938), Amador de los Rios (1960), Baer (1961), Blumenkranz (1966), Cantera
Burgos (1966), Roth (1966), Schwarzfuchs (1966a, 1966b), and Pakter (1988).
Note: when no speciﬁc cities or towns are listed in the second column, it means that the charter
was valid all over a country. YES means that the Jews were allowed to do that speciﬁc activity
(e.g., own land, or freely travel without paying internal tolls, or trade, or lend money at interest).
NO means that the Jews were prohibited from doing that speciﬁc activity. SILENT means that the
charter did not have any clause regarding that speciﬁc activity.
∗ These early charters did not survive but the charters of 1190 and 1201 conﬁrmed all the clauses
contained in the earlier charters.
Second, the early medieval charters clearly indicate that because of their high human
capital and skills, Jews as craftsmen, but especially as local and long-distance merchants,
moneylenders, tax collectors, court bankers, and royal treasurers, were viewed as essential
for economic growth and development to the point that local rulers in western Europe
competed among each other to have some Jews settle in their towns.
This is nicely illustrated by some episodes. In 1066, the Norman king William brought
some Jews with him when he conquered England in order to collect taxes and to obtain help
22with ﬁnancial matters. In 1084, bishop Rudiger-Huozmann of Speyer in Germany explained
that “when I converted the village of Spyres into a city, I believed to increase the dignity
of our locality a thousandfold if I assembled there Jews too.” He invited a group of Jewish
merchants from Mainz who were granted complete freedom to carry on their commercial
enterprises in exchange for protection and exemption from tolls. Similarly, King James I
of Aragon around 1250 encouraged Jews from France and North Africa to settle in Aragon
with land and property grants and exemptions from taxes. Around the same time, king
Ferdinand III of Castile when refusing to implement the Pope’s imposition that Jews be
forced to wear special badge and clothing, explained that otherwise, the Jews would ﬂee to
Muslim Granada, which would be disastrous for the revenues of his kingdom.52
Third, the charters from the ninth to the early thirteenth century established no re-
strictions or prohibitions on the type of occupations the Jews could engage in. As Table 6
shows, almost all charters enabled the Jews to settle in a town (or country), acquire real
estate and land, freely move within the country’s geographical boundaries, and trade in
goods as they wished. In the locations where the Jews were involved in money changing
and moneylending–an activity that became more and more prevalent among Jews from
1200 onward–the charters regulated this activity by setting, for example, the interest rate
ceiling.
Up to the early thirteenth century, the Catholic Church issued legislation regulating
Jewish business activities with the sole goal of not losing revenues rather than prohibiting
certain occupations or land owning. For example, canon 67 of the Fourth Lateran Council
in 1215 established that the Jews had to pay the tithes to the Church on the land holdings
once owned by Christians and become property of the Jews through purchase or through
moneylending (Mansi 1961). This ruling did not certainly prohibit Jews from owning or
farming land, it just ensured that the Church did not lose its steady income from tithes
regardless of the religion of the property owner.
Exactly as it happened in Muslim Spain, in all western European countries in which they
settled, most Jewish people reached very high standards of living.53 As early as 770, Pope
Stephen IV complained with the bishops of Spain that the Jews had acquired numerous
urban and rural estates in which they employed many Christian workers (Baron 1952, vol.
4, p. 42).54 Similarly, in England between 1239 and 1260, despite being a tiny proportion of
the population, the Jews contributed to about one-sixth and one-ﬁfth of the crown revenues
(Elman 1937, p. 146).
The numerous Jewish communities in Christian Spain, France, England, and Germany
52For these historical episodes, see Parkes (1938, pp. 186-87), Baron (1952, vol. 4, p. 74), Amador (1960,
vol. 1, p. 388), Grayzel (1966), and Ben Sasson (1976, pp. 394—97).
53The high standards of living did not protect them from persecutions, or may have actually been used
as an excuse to harm them. For example, in 1096 the Crusaders killed all the 800 Jews living in Worms.
Similar persecutions and massacres occurred in other locations in Europe from the twelfth century onward.
These persecutions alternated with periods of peace in which the Jewish communities came back to cities
that they had abandoned and re-establish ﬂourishing communities.
54To appreciate the extent of the wealth attained by the Jewish communities in Christian Spain, one can
also consider the size of the ﬁscal contributions they made. In 1274, the Jewish community in Saragossa
paid 15,000 solidi jac., the one in Catalayud 10,000, where the more recent community in Valencia paid
5,000 solidi (Baron 1952, vol. 10, pp. 128—33).
23also blossomed from an intellectual point of view (Agus 1965). European Jewry’s most
important intellectual movement began to thrive when Rabbenu Gershom ben Judah (960-
1028) founded a yeshiva in Mainz, Germany, which attracted Jews from all over Europe,
including the famous Rashi. Study of the Talmud increased, and the German yeshivot in
Mainz and Worms came to overshadow those in Iraq. The leadership of Rashi and of his
grandson Rabbenu Tam laid the foundations for the Ashkenazi Jewish communities that,
both economically and intellectually, separated themselves from the large Jewish communi-
ties in the Near East, and by refusing the teaching of Maimonides also separated from the
Jewish communities in Muslim Spain (Grossman 1992; 1999; and Limor 1993).
When in 1170 Benjamin de Tudela wrote his travel itinerary, the voluntary Jewish dias-
pora was at its height and world Jewry was divided in three main and almost independent
economic and intellectual centers: (i) the Near East under Muslim rule where about 80
percent of world Jewry lived at that time, (ii) Muslim Spain where tiny but wealthy Jewish
communities lived in more than 150 cities and towns, and (iii) France, England, and Ger-
many where small but equally prominent Ashkenazi Jewish communities lived in more than
160 locations (DellaPergola 2001). Similarly small Jewish communities were to be found in
an endless number of locations all over Italy, Bohemia, eastern Europe, Turkey, the Middle
East, Egypt and North Africa, all the way to central Asia, China, and India.55
9 The Mongol Shock, 1250-1260
The Mongol invasions in the 1250s, which brought the Near East back to being a farming
and pastoral economy, are an important historical development that provides an excellent
test of our theory that Judaism with its costly social norm regarding children’s education
cannot survive in the long-run in subsistence farming economies.
The Mongols ﬁrst entered Iraq in 1220, but their major invasions of Persia and Iraq
started in 1256. Their army demolished Baghdad in 1258. From there, they quickly con-
quered the main cities in Mesopotamia, Persia, Syria, and Palestine, but not Egypt because
they were defeated in 1260 by the Egyptian Mamluks, who later defeated the Crusaders
and controlled the area from Egypt to Syria (Gil 1997).
The Mongol conquests were a turning point in the demographic history of the Near
East. Table 7 shows that the population of Persia and Iraq was almost halved. In Baghdad
alone, the population dropped from about 800,000 to about 60,000.56 Many other cities
and towns almost disappeared. Famines and epidemics greatly added to the death toll.
The economic consequences of the Mongol shock were no less traumatic. The urban
and commercial economy that had ﬂourished under the Abbasid rulers in the eighth—tenth
55Studies have shown that contemporary Jewish populations show a closer genetic link to Jews from far
away locations than to their neighboring non-Jewish populations (Bonné-Tamir et al. (1978), and Hammer
et al. 2000). This is especially true for the Ashkenazi Jews of eastern Europe who are genetically closer to
Jews from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as to other Middle Eastern non-Jewish populations,
than to eastern European non-Jewish populations. This provides additional evidence that there were no
signiﬁcant conversions to Judaism once the Jews became merchants, and it shows that all Jews migrated
from the same original location (Mesopotamia).
56See Baron (1952, vol. 17, pp. 150—51), and Ashtor (1976, pp. 251—57).
24centuries almost disappeared and, instead, farming and pastoral activities became the source
of income of most households (Bausani 1971, pp. 101—23; and Lambton 1988). The ravages
of the invasions, the devastation of the irrigation system, and harsh taxation left many
farmers at subsistence levels. Eighty year after the Mongol invasions, tax revenues from
Baghdad were only 10 percent of what they had been before. For the entire Iraq, tax
revenues dropped by 80 percent (Petrushevsky 1968, pp. 497—504).
As shown in Table 7, about 800,000 Jews (about 80 percent of world Jewry) lived in
Iraq and Persia around 1200. The Mongol conquests in Near East had a major impact on
the large Jewish community, which two centuries later dropped to at most 100,000 people.
Four factors can account for this huge reduction in the Jewish population: massacres during
the Mongol invasions, deaths because of famines and diseases, migrations, and conversions.
Tdeoh 7—Tkh Dhprjudsklf Eiihfw ri wkh Mrqjro Skrfn
Total Population (million) Jewish Population (million)
Time 1200 1300 1490 1170 1300 1490
Eretz Israel 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.002 very few very few
Syria 1.75 1.75 1.5 0.015 ? 0.007
Iraq, Persia, Arabiaa 13.5 10 9.5 0.800 ? 0.100
Egypt 4 5 4 0.012 ? 0.005
North Africab 55 . 5 3 . 8 0.030 ? ?
Balkans, eastern Europec 18 23 23 0.047 0.065 0.090
Western Europed 35 50 48 0.103 0.385 0.510
TOTAL 75 95 87 1—1.2 0.8—1 0.7—0.9
Sources: For total population, see McEvedy and Jones (1978). For Jewish population, see Ashtor
(1967; 1968, p. 13; 1976, chapter 7), Baron (1971), Dols (1981, pp. 400—04), and Della Pergola
(2001, Tables 1 and 2).
Note: The years given as headings in the columns are approximate dates. One should more appro-
priately think that 1170 stands for late 12th century, 1300 for late 13th century, and 1490 for late
15th century.
a Arabia refers to the Arabian peninsula including Yemen.
b North Africa includes Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.
c Balkans include Greece and Turkey. Eastern Europe includes Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Romania.
d Western Europe includes Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Germany, the Low Countries, and Eng-
land.
The Jews seem to have been largely spared by the massacres that hit the Muslim pop-
ulation during the Mongol invasions (Gil 1997, vol. 1, p. 430). In fact, in both Jewish and
non-Jewish primary sources (travellers’ reports, letters, Responsa, or the wealth of docu-
ments of the Cairo Geniza), there is not one single reference to huge massacres of Jews
under the Mongol rulers.
25Epidemics and famines certainly took a toll on the Jewish population as they did on
the non-Jewish population (Ashtor 1959, pp. 66—68). However, there is no reason to think
that the Jews suﬀered from famines and epidemic diseases more than the local Muslim
population or other minorities.
During and after the Mongol invasions, many Jews ﬂed to Egypt and Syria, which were
ruled by the Mamluks. However, as Table 7 indicates, the Jewish communities in Egypt and
Syria also dwindled and by the end of the ﬁfteenth centuries, they were less than half the size
they had been in the late twelfth century, and consisted mostly of poverty-stricken people.57
This implies that the migrations of the Jews leaving Iraq and Persia to Egypt and Syria
after the Mongol invasions could not have been massive, or else, the Jewish communities in
Egypt and Syria would have been much larger after 1300.
Some Jews who left the Near East migrated to western Europe as the increase of the
Jewish population there shows (Della Pergola 2001).58 However, there is no mention of huge
waves of Jewish migrations from the Near East to western Europe either in the numerous
Jewish sources of the time (letters, travel itineraries, and Responsa), nor in the non-Jewish
sources (tax records, censuses, and court records). One has to remember that Jewish
migrations to western Christian Europe were regulated by kings, bishops, or local rulers,
and the Jews could not freely move there unless they were invited to settle and obtained
charters and special privileges (see Section 8).
When considering the (small) death toll from massacres by the Mongols, the death
toll from famines and epidemics (similar to the one in the non-Jewish population), and
migrations, there is still a large share of the decrease in the Jewish community in Iraq and
Persia after 1250 that is left unexplained. Baron (1952, vol. 17, p. 183) and Ashtor (1959,
pp. 65—66) maintain that conversions and assimilation of many Jews to Islam was a major
factor which explains both the large reduction of the Jewish population in Iraq and Persia,
and the shrinking Jewish communities in Egypt and Syria. Some conversions involved
wealthy and prominent Jewish leaders, merchants, and doctors. However, there is a lot
of evidence from the Responsa (for example of Abraham Maimuni) that many conversions
occurred among low income Jewish households.
While the death toll from massacres, famines and epidemics after the Mongol shock was
a feature that the Jewish population shared with the local population (although in diﬀerent
proportions), mass conversions (voluntary or forced) to Islam had occurred much earlier in
the local population of Iraq, Persia, Egypt, and Syria (Bulliet 1979a, 1979b). Thus, the
many conversions of low income Jews to Islam in the two centuries after the Mongol shock
were not part of a general conversion process in the entire population.59
The conversions of low income Jews to Islam in the Near and Middle East and Egypt
after the Mongol invasions are consistent with our thesis regarding conversions. Once Iraq
and Persia after the Mongol conquests (and Egypt and Syria under the Mamluks) became
again subsistence farming and pastoral economies, the Jews who could not migrate to
57See Baron (1952, vol. 17, pp. 160 and 219), and Ashtor (1959, p. 65; 1967; and 1968).
58Given the high standards of living attained by the Jews in medieval western Europe, a substantial share
of the increase in the Jewish population there was the outcome of higher fertility and lower mortality.
59Notice that the Mongol rulers adopted Islam only 80 years after their conquest of Iran and Iraq.
26western Europe, had to move back to being farmers and low income workers. The investment
in children’s education, as the Jewish religious norm required, became too costly in the poor
farming economies of Iraq, Persia, Syria, and Egypt, and many Jews preferred to convert
to Islam. Once converted, they had no longer to pay the poll tax and they were no longer
required to invest in their children’s religious education, which in a rural economy provided
no economic returns.
10 Concluding Remarks
It is a common and well-accepted view that the three main economic and demographic
features of Jewish history–the selection into urban and skilled occupations, the reduction
in the size of the Jewish population in various periods, and their Diaspora all over all the
world–were the outcome of restrictions, prohibitions, persecutions, and expulsions.
In this paper we built a simple model and then presented historical evidence that sup-
ports an alternative argument: these three main economic and demographic patterns in
Jewish history were the joint, long-term, and endogenous outcomes of an exogenous change
in the ﬁrst-second century C.E. This change transformed Judaism into a religion focused
on literacy and education and radically altered the religious beliefs and social norm, which
deﬁned membership in the Jewish community.
A change in the religious norm at the beginning of the ﬁrst millennium, which made every
male Jewish child learn Hebrew for purely religious purposes, brought long-term economic
returns in the form of general education, long-distance communication, and contract-writing
among Jews all over the world. The Jews moved voluntarily to new locations since they had
the skills that enabled them to engage in those occupations with high returns to their human
capital. They became a minority in all the places where they settled as their comparative
advantage was limited to few skilled occupations.
It might be that individuals with low cognitive skills were pushed out of Judaism once
the religion made literacy and education the main requirement for belonging to the Jewish
community. Under the assumption that cognitive skills are inherited, one can use our
argument to explain the higher than average cognitive abilities of Ashkenazi Jews as reported
in the very recent study of Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending (2005).
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